Following executive presidential actions in 2025 designating certain cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and classifying fentanyl and its core precursor chemicals as weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the federal government signaled an increased focus on addressing the risks posed by synthetic opioids.

While the full operational and legal implications of this designation are still being interpreted by multiple law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, one aspect is very clear: the need for reliable identification of suspected substances in the field is becoming increasingly important.

For law enforcement officers, this does not necessarily mean immediate changes to day-to-day procedures. However, it does highlight a growing emphasis on accuracy, documentation and evidentiary confidence when encountering unknown substances that may be fentanyl or related compounds.

As guidance evolves, agencies are likely to begin reassessing how they approach field identification, evidence handling and coordination with forensic laboratories. In this environment, the ability to quickly and accurately determine what a substance is — and, just as importantly, what it is not — becomes critical to both operational decision-making and downstream investigative and prosecutorial processes.

Protocols will have to change

The most significant impact on law enforcement will be in how officers handle fentanyl cases. Currently, officers discovering fentanyl, or what they believe to be fentanyl, will pursue an arrest and seize the substance concerned, assuming they have probable cause or a warrant to conduct a search or investigation. States and local jurisdictions each have their own processes and procedures in this regard.

However, the WMD designation has several gray areas that will likely require changes to operational processes.

Traditional policing protocols — such as not touching the substance and using naloxone to assist anyone who has inhaled or ingested fentanyl, resulting in a potential overdose — must be enhanced and clarified. Arresting a suspect, placing the substance in an evidence bag and returning to the station may no longer be acceptable.

When an officer suspects the presence of fentanyl, piperidone or piperidone-based substances (the precursor chemicals named in the executive order), they might be required to handle the situation as they would the discovery of chemical agents such as VX gas or sarin. Gloves and a mask may no longer be acceptable, and officers could be required to call in specialist hazmat teams. It may even automatically become a federal issue requiring federal agencies to handle the situation. Again, further clarification and specific protocols will be required.

New codes may require officers to step away from the location, even if it is a small amount of fentanyl found in a vehicle, freeze the area so that no one can approach, and call in hazmat teams to positively identify and secure the substance. It is important to note that if the operation is within a building, current WMD tactics require the building to be evacuated until specialized teams have examined it and given the all-clear.

If it turns out that the substance was not fentanyl, this complex process would be very costly for no reason. The development of new protocols must therefore include rapid and accurate identification of suspicious substances to determine whether they are fentanyl or something else, which will determine the appropriate next steps. 

Officers may be required to follow all WMD protocols for the collection and handling of evidence from the scene, through the state laboratory and into evidence storage.

Reliable onsite testing 

The ability to accurately identify a substance while on the scene is, therefore, a critical aspect of any future fentanyl interdiction. Officers must have accurate and rapid presumptive analysis capabilities at their disposal, which will reliably determine if a substance is fentanyl. Enhanced analysis tools can even identify trace amounts of fentanyl mixed into other drug cocktails.

Identifying the suspected substance serves a greater purpose than containment and safety protocols alone, although these are important. If federal charges are to be brought against individuals or groups once a narcotic-based WMD has been positively identified, officers must ensure that suspects are properly arrested and charged without placing them, the public or officers at risk.

Law enforcement officers have several methods for immediately identifying an unknown substance. The accuracy of some field test kits is unreliable, however, causing police and prosecutors to wait for confirmatory analysis from a state laboratory. Waiting for confirmation can take weeks or months due to the high workload and resulting processing backlogs these institutions face. With the WMD designation, we cannot rule out the possibility that state laboratories may require additional procedures to analyze WMDs, which could further delay the confirmatory process.

While this happens, we cannot lose sight of the fact that suspects may not be held in custody for an extended period and often vanish before a court date is set.

Access to rapid, reliable analytical results can reduce the risk of human error and limit dependence on time-intensive laboratory testing. Among available field-based techniques, Raman spectroscopy has emerged as a particularly effective option for the presumptive analysis of narcotics in non-laboratory environments. Its application assists on-scene decision-making, including probable cause determinations, while maintaining alignment with established forensic guidelines.

Supporting successful prosecutions

Domestically, once fentanyl or its precursors are identified, officers may be required to follow all WMD protocols for the collection and handling of evidence from the scene, through the state laboratory and into evidence storage. Given the dangers posed by fentanyl, many police officers are already cautious when handling it. Existing Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health protocols for any identified material will serve as a starting point. However, they will need to be expanded to address the WMD classification, including the involvement of hazmat teams when necessary.

Extra care will be required to ensure that all materials are gathered and logged, and nothing is left behind. Transportation protocols also will need updating, as moving and storing a WMD alongside other evidence is not advisable. Additionally, the suspects will need to be correctly charged under federal procedures rather than under traditional criminal processes.

Despite field-based presumptive analysis results, confirmatory analysis will still be required from state laboratories. Once received, if the report supports the presumptive analysis findings, which are often corroborated by confirmatory lab testing, prosecutors will be ready to present the case in court. Defense attorneys may find it harder to argue against technical findings from multiple presumptive analysis platforms coupled with state-based confirmatory analysis.

The WMD designation will save lives

Classifying fentanyl and its precursors as weapons of mass destruction will not only strengthen the country’s fight against narcotics smuggling and addiction, but will also save American lives. The DEA notes that as little as 2 milligrams of fentanyl can be lethal. Distributing 4 grams of the opioid could, therefore, potentially be cut into 2,000 lethal doses (depending on the purity, individual tolerance and other substances it may be mixed with).

With proper protocols developed and implemented, and experienced response teams, it will become much more difficult for defense attorneys to challenge the evidence or raise due-process concerns related to their client’s arrest. Designing the correct protocols for officers to follow will remove all doubt, from street level to the courtroom, which is especially important if the suspect is facing serious consequences, including life in prison or worse. These protocols will also reduce the probability of the wrong person being detained, ensuring that the concept of equity and due process are always employed.

An “I didn’t know it was fentanyl” defense is ineffective against WMD statutes in a federal case. With less fentanyl available, the country’s capacity to prevent fatalities and dismantle a multibillion-dollar industry is enhanced. The reduction in the drug supply will simultaneously allow local organizations to concentrate on victim recovery and support, with a lower potential for recidivism.

In the near future, the average field agent or officer will most likely be required to adhere to more stringent engagement protocols. This may open up their access to additional equipment and resources that they may not have had access to in the past. A lot of this will be driven by prosecutors and district attorneys, who will require evidence to be verified and presented in a certain way. It all depends on how long it takes authorities to set new protocols at the federal, state and local levels. Irrespective, presumptive analysis protocols will not be able to remain as they are.